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ABSTRACT: Focus of this seminar is the ways in which Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 – 1914) – “the 
father of pragmatism” – enhances our understanding of educational processes. In giving an 
account on Peirce’s later semeiotic, while pointing to some fruitful contributions from his 
“speculative rhetoric”, the seminar explores how Peirce helps to illuminate the dynamics of 
knowledge and learning embedded in the complex symbolic economies of today. In what ways 





This seminar is motivated by the intriguing fact that the complex symbolic economies of today seems 
to put conventional notions of “mind”, “society” and “education” to a test1. Taking the current 
condition, which is marked by an “era of informationalism” (Castells, 2004), transnational 
“knowledge economies” (Bindé, 2003; World bank, 2008), and by implication an emerging 
“epistemification of everyday life” (Knorr Cetina, 2007; Elam & Bertilsson, 2003), it is held that the 
dynamics of globalised symbolic economies, altered knowledge cultures, and educational processes 
seems to be under-theorised (Beck & Szneider, 2006; Guile, 2008; Paavola & Hakkarainen, 2005; 
                                                          
1
 This quite bold statement should be read on the background of my work on “The Cosmopolitan Turn” (Strand, 2010; 2011) 
and workplace learning (Strand, 2010; Strand & Jensen, 2011). 
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Strand, 2010; Strand & Jensen, 2011). Consequently, there is a common call for a reconceptualization 
of educational processes. 
I here respond to this call by exploring some ways in which the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce – “the 
father of pragmatism” – helps to illuminate the dynamics of knowledge and learning embedded in 
the complex symbolic economies of today. My ambition is to map out how the later writings of 
Peirce offers an alternative metaphor of mind and cognition, and thus seems to carry a promise of a 
philosophy of education that moves beyond traditional notions of the dynamics of knowledge and 
learning.  
In short, the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce - “the father of pragmatism” - enhances our 
understanding of educational processes. Peirce conceives knowledge as “a living historic entity”, 
acquired through experience, mediated through signs, clarified by the pragmatic maxim, and 
validated by the final consensus. To Peirce, knowledge is a verb, marked by the communal processes 
of constructing, reconstructing and validating beliefs. In his earlier writings, Peirce was concerned by 
stressing how these processes of inquiry should be guided by the pragmatic principle, the social 
principle, fallibilism, and abduction: The pragmatic principle points to the pragmatic maxim as a 
proposal for achieving clarity of meaning. The social principle recognizes “the ideal perfection of 
knowledge” through the final consensus. Fallibilism admits the provisional and rectifiable character 
of opinions and – in avoiding overconfidence in the results – points to the trustworthiness of the 
inferential procedures used. To Peirce, however, the pragmatic, social and fallibilistic principles are 
valueless if they do not include abduction, which is the principle for creative innovation. “Abduction 
is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces 
any new idea”. A Peircean conception of the dynamics of knowledge and learning may thus, at one 
analytic level, be characterized as mutual and creative commitments towards shared processes of 
joint learning (Strand, 2005a, 2005b).  
However, in his later writings, Peirce offers a richer conception of productive learning processes, as 
he now establishes an explicit connection between his phenomenology, pragmatism and semiotic, 
thus renewing all three. He now develops his early “semiotics” into a more general theory of signs 
(“semeiotics”) and sign use (“semeiosis”), which is equated with logic in a broad sense. Next, 
semeiotics – ”the analytical study of the necessary conditions to which all signs are subject” – is 
divided into three major divisions: Speculative grammar studies the production and forms of 
meaning; Critic (logic in a narrow sense) studies the ways in which the sign can relate to the object 
independently from what it represents, meaning logical conclusions and arguments; Speculative 
rhetoric studies the relation between sign and interpretant, the method or the production of 
knowledge itself: “Its most essential business is to ascertain by logical analysis, greatly facilitated by 
the development of the other branches of semeiotics, what are the indispensable conditions of sign’s 
acting to determine another sign nearly equivalent of itself” (Peirce, 1904, p. 328). To Peirce, 
speculative rhetoric is therefore “the highest and liveliest branch of logic” as its task is to study the 
processes by which understanding and knowledge is created. 
Currently, there is an emerging interest in this third discipline of semeiotics, and several 
contemporary Peirce-scholars demonstrate how Peirce’s new rhetoric not only is distinctive from a 
classical rhetoric, but also how Peirce’s new rhetoric carries prospects of a new outlook of the 
3 
 
paradoxical attributions of knowledge and learning (Bergman, 2007, 2009; Colapietro, 2007; 
Freadman, 2004; Kevelson, 1984; Liszka, 1996, 2000; Midtgarden, 2005; Santaella-Braga, 1999; Short, 
2007; Strand, 2010). Moreover, Peirce’s later writings appeal to the concerns of contemporary 
philosophers of education, since it seems to promise a renewed epistemology emphasizing the 
semeiotic production of knowledge (Anderson, 2005; Bergman, 2005; Chiasson, 2001, 2005; 
Colapietro, 2005; Garrison, 2005; Hoffman, 2006, 2007; Midtgarden, 2005; Paavola & Hakkarainen, 
2005; Nöth, 2010; Pesce, 2010, 2011; Prawat, 1999; Strand, 2005a, 2005b, 2010; Stables, 2005, 2010; 
Semetsky, 2005, 2010; Ventimiglia, 2005). My modest ambition here, however, is just to illustrate 
how Peirce, in offering an alternative metaphor of mind and cognition, seems to move beyond 
traditional notions of educational processes. 
I start by introducing an analogy on pedagogy used by Peirce in a 1903 paper on phenomenology: 
Through a close reading of this analogy, I sketch out Peirce’s perspective on the ways in which 
“experience teach”. Next, I outline Peirce’s conception of semiosis as a metaphor of educational 
processes. In summing up, I sketch out a few prospects of a Peircean semiotics as a model of the 
dynamics of knowledge and learning.  
 
EXPERIENCE TEACH 
Peirce values learning from experience, claiming in a 1903 essay on phenomenology that “experience 
is our only teacher” (Peirce, 1903, p. 153). He does not undermine learning from reasoning, but 
argue that “what we are taught by experience is not justified at all: on the contrary, the less it is like 
previous knowledge, the more valuable an information it is, other things being equal” (Peirce, 1911, 
p. 454). In stressing the value of experiences violating previous taught, playing by chance, and 
learning from unexpected events he even contends that 
In all the works on pedagogy that ever I read, - and that have been many, big, and heavy, - I don’t 
remember that any one has advocated a system of teaching by practical jokes, mostly cruel. That, 
however, described the method of our great teacher, Experience. She says, 
Open your mouth and shut your eyes 
And I’ll give you something to make wise; 
And thereupon she keeps her promise, and seems to take her pay in the fun of tormenting us (Peirce, 
1903, p. 154). 
Here, Peirce quotes a folklore children’s rhyme, cited when giving the child a gift of sweets: “Open 
your mouth and shut your eyes, and I’ll give you something to make wise”. But mother may be 
“hiding a spoonful of bitter medicine behind her back”. If so, the child’s experience of a sudden, 
sharp pain or horrible taste “flies right to the knowing heart like an arrow. No mediation is necessary 
here” (McCarty, 2010, p. 93). So, with this analogy, Peirce juxtaposes experience to a practical joke 
while claiming that a practical joke, despite its cruelty, may be a good thing. 
There seems to be a parallel between Peirce’s claim that jokes make us wise, and Aristotle’s claim 
that riddles convey learning. Peirce speaks about “teaching by practical jokes”. Aristotle says that 
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“Good riddles are pleasing … for there is learning” (Aristotle, 1991, 1412a 26). We learn from riddles, 
since “the very nature indeed of a riddle is this, to describe a fact in an impossible combination of 
words (which cannot be done with the real names for things, but can be with their metaphorical 
substitutes) (Aristotle, 1992, 1458a 24-29). Consequently, the riddle provides an unexpected and 
contradictory image, concurrently saying that “this is that” and “this is not that”. This paradox 
surprises, bewilders, and helps to uncover a hidden relation beyond the paradox. It is exactly this 
paradoxical attribution of the riddle – or practical joke – that conveys learning. Aristotle therefore 
says that learning “... occurs when there is a paradox and not, as he *Theodorus+ says, in opposition 
to previous opinion; rather it is like the bogus word coinages in jests” (Aristotle 1991, 1412a 33 – 38). 
In short, the paradoxical attribution of a riddle first, surprises – as it describes a fact in an unexpected 
manner; next, it bewilders – as it contests our previous categories of thought; and third, it conveys 
learning – as it uncovers a relationship hidden beneath the paradox (Ricoeur, 1977). When speaking 
of “a system of teaching by practical jokes, mostly cruel”, Peirce thus paraphrases Aristotle’s way of 
equating riddles with “the bogus word coinages in jests”. 
Peirce, however, goes beyond Aristotle. Aristotle attributes learning to the “impossible combination 
of words”, but Peirce attributes learning – as he says – to “the action of experience” (Peirce, 1903, p. 
154). This action comes forward as “a series of surprises”:  
The phenomenon of surprise in itself is highly instructive [...] because of the emphasis it puts upon a 
mode of consciousness which can be detected in all perception, namely, a double consciousness at 
once of an ego and a non-ego, directly acting upon each other” (Peirce, 1903a, p. 154).  
So, the most significant characteristic of experience is its “pedagogy of surprise”, which definitely 
moves beyond an experiential “didactics” (i.e. Nöth, 2010, p. 3).  The action of surprise is not 
something external to experience. Contrary, Peirce attributes the surprise to the contradictions 
inherent in experience itself. Imagine that 
Your mind was filled with an imaginary object that was expected. At the moment when it was 
expected the vividness of the representation is exalted, and suddenly when it should come -something 
quite different comes instead. I ask you whether at that instant of surprise there is not a double 
consciousness, on the one hand of an Ego, which is simply the expected idea suddenly broken off, on 
the other hand of the Non-Ego, which is the Strange Intruder, in his abrupt entrance (Peirce, 1903, p. 
154). 
In other words, the series of surprise, which indeed jumbles our categories of thought, happen 
because of a double consciousness which on the one hand is aware of the familiar and vivid 
representations of the expected and on the other hand of the new and unexpected ways of seeing. 
The surprise is not in the abrupt and unexpected experience. The surprise is rather in the relationship 
between the known and the unknown; between the familiar and the new; or between the “expected 
idea” and the “strange intruder”. So, the reason for the surprise is that we experience the relation 
between our familiar ways of thinking and something totally new and unexpected.  
In stressing this relation, or rather the experience of it through a double consciousness, Peirce again 
questions the Cartesian dualism in Kant, Reid and Leibniz. Peirce says: “every philosopher who denies 
the doctrine of Immediate Perception, - including idealists of every stripe, - by that denial cuts off all 
possibility of ever cognizing a relation” (Peirce, 1903, p. 154, my emphasis). In other words, Peirce 
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seems to parallel the practical joke with Aristotle’s riddle that articulates truly new things in an 
unexpected manner. There is also a parallel between Aristotle and Peirce in the ways in which the 
paradoxical attribution of the riddle – or the joke – surprises, bewilders and teach. But to Peirce, the 
reason for learning from this bewilderment – or “the series of surprises” as he says – is the action of 
experience: Experience is a great teacher because she acts upon our minds by a series of surprises, 
bewildering our categories of thought, and makes us learn. But how should we read Peirce’s notion 
of experience? 
 
A PRAGMATIST NOTION OF EXPERIENCE 
Peirce places phenomenology as the primary branch of philosophy, since philosophy “does not busy 
itself with gathering facts, but merely with learning what can be learned from that experience which 
presses in upon every one of us daily and hourly” (Peirce, 1903, p. 196). To Peirce, the object of 
philosophical inquiry is everyday experience: “... the very etymology of the word tells that it comes 
ex perioto, ‘out of practice’ (Peirce, 1913, MS 681:13). So, as Peirce clearly rejects a spectator-theory 
of knowledge, we should not speak of a Peircean “philosophy of experience”. Contrary, we are 
dealing with a philosophy in experience: “in philosophy there is no special observational art, and 
there is no knowledge antecedently acquired in the light of which experience is to be interpreted. 
The interpretation itself is experience” (Peirce, 1906, p. 388). Such “common sense” experience is 
never pure, never neutral. But it is of significantly importance, since experience is “the enforced 
element in the history of our lives” (Peirce, 1898, p. 47). 
To Peirce, experience is not something presented in small pieces, bit by bit, and next glued together 
by the human mind (Bergman, 2009; Short, 2007): “Experience can only mean the total cognitive 
result of living, and includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense” (Peirce, 
1903, p. 197). Peirce thus advocates a broad notion of experience. He also rejects a sensational 
conception of experience. In a letter to William James, he asserts that: “… experience and an 
experiential event are … utterly different, experience being the effect that life has produced upon 
habits” (Peirce, 1905, p. 203). Peirce criticizes James’ way of limiting experience to sensations and 
their patterns, and thus overlooking the interpretational aspects: A sensation is not the same thing as 
an experience, since “experience is the effect that life has produced upon habits”. To Peirce, a 
Jamesian notion of experience is too narrow, since James ignores the reality of semeiotic habits. 
To Peirce, experience is in translations, or rather in transactions. Experience is never pure, never 
neutral. Experience comes “out of practice”, it is a “forcibel modification of our ways of thinking” 
(Peirce, 1905, p. 370), and a “brutally produced conscious effect that contributes to a habit” (Peirce, 
1907, p. 399). Thus, the influence of experience cannot be explained by mechanical action. But there 
is an inescapable rudeness in experience, as experience compellingly influence our ways of being in 
the world. Indeed, the course of life presents us with this reality: We may lie about our experience, 
but we can never escape it. 
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Peirce’s phenomenology2 identifies three universal categories of experience; feeling (firstness), 
resistance (secondness), and learning (thirdness). To Peirce 
Phenomenology is that branch of science which is treated in Hegel’s Phenomenologie des Geistes (a 
work far too inaccurate to be recommended to any but mature scholars, though perhaps the most 
profound ever written) in which the author seeks to make out what are the elements, or, if you please, 
the kind of elements, that are invariably present in whatever is, in any sense, in mind. According to the 
present writer, these universal categories are three. Since all three are invariably present, a pure idea 
of any one, absolutely distinct from others, is impossible; indeed, anything like a satisfactorily clear 
discrimination of them is a work of long and active mediation. They may be Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness (Peirce, 1903, p. 267). 
Firstness is pure presence; it is what there is, regardless of anything else. It is the immediate 
perception of qualities, such as the qualities of feelings or sensations. It is “what stares one in the 
face, just as it presents itself, unreplaced by any interpretation, unsophisticated by any allowance for 
this or for that…” (Peirce, 1903, p. 147). 
Secondness contains an element of struggle or reaction in our consciousness, it “fasten itself like a 
bulldog upon the particular feature that we are studying” (Peirce, 1903, p. 147). Secondness involves 
the relation of a first to a second. It is immediate perception of the pure presence, or in other words, 
the idea of “that which is such as it is” (Peirce, 1903, p. 160), - or of that which “flies right to the 
knowing heart like an arrow” (McCarty, 2010, p. 93). Since secondness entails firstness, secondness is 
an element of the phenomenon itself. Secondness therefore “represents two objects to us; an ego 
and a non-ego” (Peirce, 1903, p. 195). In this respect, secondness is a dyadic consciousness, or a 
double consciousness which on the one hand is aware of the familiar and vivid representations and 
on the other hand of the perception. To Peirce, secondness – “the category of reaction” – is “beyond 
all doubt an irreducible element of thought” (Peirce, 1903, p. 160). However, secondness does not 
entail the phenomenon of learning from experience. 
Thirdness is learning. “Thirdness essentially involves the production of effects in the world of 
existence, - not by furnishing energy, but by the gradual development of Law” (Peirce, 1903, p. 271). 
So, in addition to the immediate, incommunicable perception of the qualities of “pure presence” 
(firstness) and the forceful, dyadic consciousness of “resistance” (secondness), thirdness entails 
“learning”, or “the felt sense of personal transformation (of acquiring a new habit or at least of 
having one’s present habits strengthened, refined, or in some other way modified)” (Colapietro, 
1999, p. 23). Thirdness contains firstness and secondness, but it is by no way reducible to the two. 
When Peirce – in his letter to William James – defines experience as “the effect that life has 
produced upon habits” (Peirce, 1905, p. 203), he implicitly says that any experience has an import on 
our habits. Moreover, that an experience is to be recognized by the way our habits are being 
transformed. So, evidently, this third category of learning is vital to Peirce’s pragmatist notion of 
experience. It is also a key to Peirce’s phenomenology, which lies at the very heart of his late 
                                                          
2
 It should here be noted that Peirce’s phenomenology, which aims at identifying and isolating the universal categories of 
experience, differs from a continental phenomenology. When Peirce introduced his phenomenology (later named 
phaneroscopy) in his Harvard lectures of 1903, he referred to Hegel’s “three stages of thought”, which he labeled “Hegel’s 
Universal Categories” (Peirce, 1903, p. 148). There is no evidence that Peirce knew of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, 
which had been published just two years earlier (Brent, 1988; Short, 1907). 
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philosophy. Moreover, this third category helps to understand Peirce’s claim that “Experience is our 
great Teacher” (Peirce, 1903, p. 194). But while experiences teach, signs are the only means of 
learning we have. 
 
EDUCATION AS SEMIOSIS 
The point of departure of Peirce’s semeiotics – which is the study of the action of signs and sign-
systems – is the axiom that cognition, thought, and even man are semiotic in their essence: Thoughts 
are in signs, and like a sign, a thought refers to other thoughts and to objects in the world so that “all 
which is reflected upon has *a+ past” (Peirce, 1868, p. 24). The most central concepts of semeiotics 
are “sign” and “semeiosis”.  
A “sign” is a medium and a mediator, a representation which itself is “an element of the 
Phenomenon” (Peirce 1903, p. 160). To illustrate, Peirce wrote in a letter to F. C. Russell: “to peel off 
signs and to get down to the real thing is like trying to peel an onion and get down to onion an sich” 
(quoted from Brent, 1988, p. 357). The mediating structure of the sign refers to the triadic relation of 
object-sign-interpretant, which inevitably includes the sign-relations themselves, which “are even 
more characteristic of signs” than the object and the interpretant. 
I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and 
an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines 
the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined 
by the object through the mediation of this “sign” (Peirce, 1907, p. 410). 
The most characteristic feature of Peirce’s notion of a sign is its triadic structure, which identifies sign 
as a “medium of communication” (Peirce, 1903, p. 239) and creation. Peirce surprisingly emphasizes 
that signs “bring about a physical result” (Peirce, 1904, p. 326). And he repeats: “…certain is it that 
somehow and in some true and proper sense general ideas do produce stupendous physical effects” 
(ibid., p. 326). The rather naïve example he uses, is a man’s intention to go to his office, in which the 
intention is a general idea, a sign, and the fact that the man actually moves towards the office is a 
physical fact. Peirce reply to the objection that it is not ideas, but peoples beliefs in ideas that has 
physical consequences, is that ideas are that which create pioneers, courage, develop people’s 
character, and which allows some people to have almost a magical leadership. And he adds that 
ideas cannot be examined or communicated in and by themselves, but only through their physical 
manifestations. If not embodied, signs do not exist. 
Signs are not only means of communication, but also creation. The initial process of establishing self-
understanding is an example to illustrate how signs tend to represent object-relations as a source of 
effects, and thereby causing that very effect: A newborn baby lives in a symbiosis. The child does not 
distinguish between herself and the surrounding world, between her own body and her mother’s. 
But the baby can experience deprivation from her mother’s absence. The baby may perceive this 
feeling as something that takes place within herself. However, the baby’s feeling of deprivation has 
no meaning before it is interpreted in relation to the mother’s absence and the baby’s self. The 
baby’s self-understanding may thus emerge as soon the feeling the mother’s separation induces in 
her is interpreted as a sign related to an object, i. e. the baby’s relation to her mother.  
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Learning processes may thus – at one analytical level – be seen as sign-interpreting processes of 
translation (or transactions) aiming at making the world intelligible. Such processes include all kinds 
of sign relations in which each relation is part of a complicated network of interpretations: Cognitive 
processes are sign relations in terms of interactive systems of actions where each process gives birth 
to one or several new processes. 
The relation of an antecedent to its consequence, in its confusion of signification with the interpretant, 
is nothing but a special case of what occurs in all action of one thing upon another, modified so as to 
be merely an affair of being represented instead of really being. It is the representative action of the 
sign upon its object. For whenever one thing acts upon another it determines in that other a quality 
that would not otherwise have been there (Peirce, 1904, p. 305, my emphasis). 
So, to Peirce, the dynamics of knowledge and learning are in the flows of signs that “presses upon 
every one of us daily and hourly.” These flows of signs are “semeiosis”.  
By semeiosis I mean, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, 
such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this thri-relative influence not being in any way 
resolvable into actions between pairs (Peirce, 1907, p. 411, my emphasis).  
Peirce’s notion of “semeiosis” highlights the power of signs to move agents and to change their 
habits. This involves thirdness:  
Thirdness essentially involves the production of effects in the world of existence; - not by furnishing 
energy, but by the gradual development of Laws. For it can be said, without dispute, that no sign ever 
acts as such without producing a physical replica of interpreting sign (Peirce, 1903, p. 271). 
Peirce’s notion of “semeiosis” – which he introduced in his later writings – represents an important 
shift in focus; - from the structure of signs towards the mediating acting of signs. Peirce’s notion of 
“semeiosis” thus again draws attention to his broad notion of “experience”, which entails thirdness – 
the phenomenological category of learning – as requisite. So, what is there to be learned from 
Peirce’s way of portraying the rudeness of lived experience? 
 
PEIRCE’S NEW RHETORIC 
 
To philosophy of education, Peirce offers an alternative metaphor of cognition: Semeiosis. Peirce’s 
axiom that cognition, thought, and even man are semeiotic in their essence invites a semeiotic 
reading of educational processes. Thoughts are in the flows of signs, and like a flow of signs, a 
thought refers to other thoughts and to objects in a world of change: We understand the world 
through signs; signs are our means to think about relations and objects. Signs give access to the 
local/global semiosphere in which we live and work; to the historically produced knowledge 
repertoire of our culture; and to the fast flows of information and communication distributed 
through social media and virtual networks (Lotman, 1991; Strand, 2010; Vygotsky, 1978). Our 
understanding of the world is therefore always mediated through historically-based signs, and thus 
by the referential domain they elicit between our mind and our local/global semiosphere. Moreover, 




While strongly rejecting semeiotic formalism, Midtgarden (2005) and Bergman (2005) both have 
explored the learning-theoretical potential of Peirce’s later semeiotic. Midtgarden, in reading Peirce’s 
speculative grammar, underlines “the virtues of the abstractness of Peirce’s conceptual strategy”, 
because such abstractness “secures generality in covering various kinds of learning processes”.  
Bergman (2005; 2009; 2010), however, reads Peirce’s speculative rhetoric3, which highlights “the 
semeiotic effect that a sign determines in an interpreter”. Bergman thus recognises the value of sign 
actions – the semiotic effect – which may reveal the diverse, complex and hybrid aspects of 
knowledge production. A move from speculative grammar to speculative rhetoric thus corresponds 
to a move from an abstract to a practical outlook, going “back towards the rough ground of human 
practices in their irreducible heterogeneity” (Colapietro, 2007, p. 11)”. So, what are the prospects of 
Peirce’s speculative rhetoric for educational theory and research? In what ways may Peirce’s later 
semeiotic carry a promise of a productive theory of the dynamics of knowledge and learning that 
moves beyond traditional notions of educational processes? 
Following Liszka (1996) the prospect of a speculative rhetoric – which according to Peirce is “the 
highest and most lively branch of logic” and concerns the relation between the sign and the 
interpretant – is the analytic study of the establishment of the formal conditions for a universe of 
discourse, communication and inquiry:       
 












Process A universe of discourse Communication Inquiry 
Product Common sense  Information Consensus 
Effect Sensibility 
Comprehensibility 
Understanding Establishment of true 
beliefs  
From Liszka 1996, p 81 
In his systematic reading of Peirce’s speculative rhetoric – which he claims “permeates Peirce’s entire 
corpus of work” (Lizka 1996, p. 78) – Liszka demonstrates how Peirce offers a sophisticated tool for 
exploring the dynamic relations of knowledge and learning in terms of a (1) universe of discourse or 
common sense (having community as a product and sensibility and comprehensibility as effects); (2) 
processes of communication (having information as a product and understanding as an effect); and 
(3) processes of inquiry (having consensus as a product and reasonableness as an effect). He relates 
this three domains to the three divisions of interpretants; the immediate, the dynamic, and the final 
interpretant. Keeping in mind that the interpretant is understood as process, product and effect, 
                                                          
3
 After his “rhetorical turn” Peirce establishes an explicit connection between his phenomenology, pragmatism and 
semeiotic and develops his early “semiotic” into a more general theory of signs (“semeiotic”) and sign use (“semeiosis”). He 
divides semeiotic into three major divisions: Speculative grammar studies the production and forms of meaning; Critic 
studies the ways in which the sign can relate to the object independently from what it represents, meaning logical 
conclusions and arguments; Speculative rhetoric studies the relation between sign and interpretant, or the semeiotic 
production of knowledge. Thus, Peirce’s speculative rhetoric is a fruitful point of departure when exploring the generative 
action of signs. 
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Lizka thus argues that speculative rhetoric offers a sophisticated tool for exploring the dynamics of 
knowledge and learning in terms of a universe of discourse, processes of communication, and 
processes of inquiry4. 
Productive learning processes therefore involve the influence of a normative5 element that guides 
the ways in which knowledge grows6.  Peirce’s conception of experience is a key to understand this 
element, and thus how he conceives productive learning processes as concurrently semeiotic and 
pragmatic: 
We all admit that Experience is our great Teacher; and Dame Experience practices a pedagogic method 
which springs from her own affable and complacent nature. Her favourite way of teaching is by means 
of practical jokes, - the more cruel the better. To describe it more exactly, Experience invariably 
teaches by means of surprises (Peirce, 1903, p. 194). 
So, “it is by surprise that experience teaches us all she deigns to teach us” (Peirce, 1903, p. 154). The 
surprise is in the relation between the expected and the unexpected, which evokes a “double 
consciousness” of, on the one hand, our familiar ways of thinking and, on the other hand, something 
totally new. This “double consciousness” is productive, since it generates a “genuine doubt” that 
disturbs earlier ways of seeing the world (Peirce, 1905, p. 348). Accordingly, “thought plays a part” in 
a Peircean conception of experience (Peirce, 1903, p. 269): 
An “Experience” is a brutally produced conscious effect that contributes to a habit, self-controlled, yet 
so satisfying, on deliberation, as to be destructible by no positive exercise of internal vigor [sic.]. I use 
the word “self-controlled” for “controlled by the thinker’s self”... (Peirce, 1908, p. 435). 
Experience is a conscious effect that creates a self-controlled habit. In experience, conscious thought 
plays a part. Since “ideas do grow in the process”, semeiosis is not merely a matter of sign-
translations:  
The pragmaticist insists that this is not at all, and offers to back his assertion by proof. He grants that 
the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is the summum bonum. But he 
undertakes to prove by the minute examination of logic that signs which should be merely parts of an 
endless viaduct of the transmission of idea-potentiality, without any conveyance of it into anything but 
                                                          
4
 Pesce (2010) demonstrates a way of adopting such an outlook in an empirical study on educational processes. 
5
 Peirce maintains that “A Logic *semeiotics+ which does not recognize its relation to Ethics must be fatally unsound in its 
Methodeutic [the branch of semeiotic, also named Rhetoric, that studies the semeiotic production of knowledge], if not in 
its Critic” (Peirce, 1903, p. 272).  
6 Already in his early writings, Peirce reveals his discoursive conception of “truth” and “reality” (Apel, 1995; Hausmann, 
1995): “The opinion to be fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the 
object represented in this opinion is the real. This is the way I would explain reality” (EP 2:139). Private experiences, 
syllogisms, or conclusions thus have to be re-examined socially: Beliefs have to be justified in a process in which your beliefs 
rectify mine, and others rectify ours. Next, the more people involved in these joint processes of validation, and the longer 
time we spend on this common effort, the greater the possibility of arriving at a reasonable interpretation. Such communal 
processes of inquiry are generated by a “critical common sense”, rooted in pragmatism, and aim at a discoursive making of 




symbols, namely into action or habit of action, would not be sign at all, since they would not, little or 
much, fulfill the function of signs; and further, that without embodiment in something else than 
symbols, the principles of logic show there never could be the least growth in idea-potentiality (Peirce, 
1906, p. 388, my emphasis). 
To Peirce, this growth in “idea-potentiality” is a vital mark of the productive dynamics of knowledge 
and learning. However, such growth – or productive learning processes – can never happen without 
first, the acting of signs and next, the embodiment of sign-processes. So, a Peircean notion of 
learning moves beyond mere sign-translations. To understand Peirce’s way of modeling productive 
learning processes, we should also look to his pragmatism, which is “a method of ascertaining the 
meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call “intellectual concepts,” that is to say, of those upon 
the structure of which arguments concerning objective fact may hinge” (Peirce, 1907, p. 401). In 
other words: The pragmatic principle points to how practical considerations are vital, in the sense 
that “beliefs are the principles upon which we are willing to act” (EP 2:33)7. As such, knowledge and 
beliefs are not only based on former experiences and beliefs, but also on future expectations. Thus, 
the pragmatic maxim should by no way be read as a “condition for counting anything as true”, since 
our beliefs “may be ever so clear without being true” (EP 2:139). To beliefs to be true, they have to 
be rectified and validated socially: “So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic” (EP 2:81). So 
again, self-control seems crucial, since  
without it, or at least without that of which it is symptomatic, the resolves and exercises of the inner 
world could not affect the real determinations and habits of the outer world. I say that this belongs to 
the outer world because they are not mere fantasies but are real agencies (Peirce, 1907, p. 419).  
In sum, to Peirce, the dynamics of knowledge and learning are in signs. However, for these dynamics 
to be productive, sign processes have to be embodied. Next, the conscious effects of such processes 
should be subjects to self-control and pragmatic examination. 
 
PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS OF A PEIRCEAN OUTLOOK 
In summing up, it should be noted that I have only touched upon a few aspects of Peirce’s later 
philosophy: To throw lights on Peirce’s conception of how “experience teach”, the phenomenological 
categories have been central. Accordingly, the ways in which Peirce – after the turn of the century – 
integrates his phenomenology, semeiotics and pragmatism in order to portray how “knowledge 
grows” have been sketched out. But needless to say, I regret that there has not been room for 
portraying – for example – the ways in which Peirce stresses the import of common sense; “the social 
principle”; and creativity to productive learning processes8. Nevertheless, the elaboration above 
                                                          
7
 The pragmatic proposal for achieving clarity of meaning thus lies at the heart of Peirce’s semeiotic. However, due to 
repetitive misinterpretations of his pragmatic maxim, Peirce finds it pertinent to stress that it is the conceivable 
consequences that helps to make our ideas clear. For example when underlining that “the real meaning of a purely 
theoretical statement or word *…+ does precisely lie in the conceivability, quite regardless of the practicability, of such 
applications” (EP 2:425). Our conceptions and beliefs, then, become clear and meaningful by virtue of an anticipated future. 
8
 I regret that I have not have elaborated on ways in which Peirce stresses the value of discontinuous educational processes 
(i.e. Anderson, 2005; Hausman, 1991; Houser, 2010; Strand, 2005; 2010). Houser (2010) uses the term “semiotic moment” 
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should help to identify how Peirce offers an alternative metaphor of cognition and how he places 
lived experience at the heart of the dynamics of knowledge and learning. 
Peirce’s semeiotic is a broad logic, offering an alternative metaphor of mind and emphasising the 
knowledge generating processes themselves. To philosophy of education, Peirce’s later philosophy 
thus invites a shift in perspective from the psychological processes of learning towards the semeiotic 
processes that characterises the processes of meaning productions and the growth of knowledge 
itself. It should be said that Peirce’s semeiotics is distinct from other schools of semiotics, in that this 
is a highly sophisticated and abstract philosophical perspective on the dynamics of knowledge and 
learning, impossible to separate from his phenomenology and pragmatism. Peirce himself portrayed 
his semeiotics as a “general science,” based on a “doctrine” of signs, and divided into three major 
branches of meta-theoretical studies on “the necessary conditions to which all signs are subject”: 
Speculative grammar, speculative critic, and speculative rhetoric. Peirce’s philosophy of signs should 
thus not be read as a theory of signs or a method of studying them, but rather as a highly 
sophisticated philosophical perspective on signs and semeiosis. Peirce’s philosophy does not offer a 
theory of experiential learning, a didactics of experiential pedagogy, or an “edusemeiotics” of 
teaching. Nevertheless, as Peirce’s perspective on experience and the pedagogy of surprise lies at the 
heart of his later philosophy, the later writings of Peirce invite a sophisticated framework for further 
philosophical deliberations on the semeiotic growth of knowledge.  
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